Sacramento Injury Lawyer Blog

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIM

Although discovery has not been pursued with regard to this claim, Ms. Smith contends that Ethan Jones (her quasi-supervisor for a period of time because her direct supervisor rarely came to work) and Charles Green, her second level supervisor treated her differently than males in comparable positions.

More significantly, Ms. Smith’s supervisor, Sam White, who Plaintiff will testify was completely incompetent, frequently absent, and was the person who left her confidential evaluation on the computer screen was never terminated despite his incredibly poor performance.

EQUAL PAY ACT CLAIM

While Ms. Smith worked for Foundation, she suffered wage discrimination as defined by the state and federal Equal Pay Acts. Ms. Smith’s salary was very low for her position. Many others in her position were managers but she was refused that title. Plaintiff alleges that the male hired in her prior position shortly after she asked to be transferred to Rosevillewas paid $6,000 more a year than she was in that same position.
Foundation argue the reason for the pay discrepancy was the male employee's greater qualifications, but Ms. Smith will testify that the qualifications which actually applied to the job in question were equal; it was the pay that was different.

Continue reading "Healthcare Employee Files Discrimination Action For Retaliatory Firing, Part 8 of 8" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

Exposing governmental inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable significance. As the Court noted in Connick, public employers should, as a matter of good judgment, be receptive to constructive criticism offered by their employees. 461 U.S., at 149, 103 S.Ct. 1684. The dictates of sound judgment are reinforced by the powerful network of legislative enactments-such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes-available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8); Cal. Govt.Code Ann. § 8547.8 (West 2005); Cal. Lab.Code Ann. § 1102.5 (West Supp.2006) ... These imperatives, as well as obligations arising from any other applicable constitutional provisions and mandates of the criminal and civil laws, protect employees and provide checks on supervisors who would order unlawful or otherwise inappropriate actions.

Further, Defendant's argument that Plaintiff has no legal protection for reporting illegal practices because such reporting was an essential part of her job duties turns logic and law upside down. If Defendant's position were accepted, it would mean that the very employee charged with reporting illegal activity would have no incentive to make a report because the employee would not be protected from retaliation for reporting the illegal conduct. Fortunately, and not surprisingly, California law does not abandon those employees most in need of legal protection, i.e., those who by virtue of their position must report illegal activity. See e.g. Green v. Ralee Eng. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 79 (public policy termination claim properly stated by quality control inspector who complained about unsafe conditions on airplane despite that the quality control inspector, like Plaintiff here, was simply doing his job);

Continue reading "Hospital Employye From Roseville Claims Workplace Discrimination, Part 7 of 8" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

Foundation argues that Smith was terminated for legitimate reasons, cannot prove otherwise by showing that the reasons were pretext for retaliatory animus, and therefore it should prevail on summary judgment. As Smith’s claim is a state law claim for retaliation, the California Court of Appeal decision in Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 686, is directly on point. As clarified by the Mamou court, while pretext is certainly a relevant issue...the central issue...whether the evidence as a whole supports a reasoned inference that the challenged action was the product of retaliatory animus. (Id. at 715.) At the summary judgment stage, the court's duty is to determine whether the employee's evidence is too weak to sustain a reasoned inference in the employee's favor. (Id. at 718.) If reasonable competing inferences may be drawn from the facts, summary judgment should be denied. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., supra, 398 US at 157; Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. San Luis Obispo County (9th Cir. 1987) 841 F2d 872, 875.

In this case, while a jury could draw a reasoned inference that the very close proximity in time between Plaintiff's complaints and her termination was coincidental, the jury could also draw a reasoned inference that the proximity between the two acts was evidence enough of retaliatory animus. Fisher v. San Pedro (1989) 214 Cal.App. 3d 590, 615 (one may infer retaliation by the proximity in time between protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory employment decision.)

Continue reading "Workplace Discrimination Action Filed Against Roseville Healthcare Provider, Part 6 of 8" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

While working at Foundation North Side, Ms. Lane made frequent complaints to upper management, including officers and managing agents such as Oliver Browne and Ethan Jones, regarding the failure of Foundation to address serious patient and staff safety issues. None of Ms. Smith’s complaints received any substantive response, other than her termination. The subjects of these complaints included:

* OSHA violations including concerns about frequent blood splashes and gastric juices deposited on nurses and the failure of Kaiser to install necessary OSHA required eyewash stations.

* The continued use of non-safety needles to avoid accidental punctures of staff.

* Toxicity of a new facility at Richmond and a manager's withholding of the report of work that was being done to correct that toxicity found in the Forensic Analytical report commissioned by Charles Smythe to the employees in the building.

* The loss by Sam White of Personal Air Purification Respirators given to Roseville to protect staff and patients from airborne pathogens and would not find them.

* The lack of fit testing for N-95 respirators at the Roseville facility.

* The placement of tuberculosis patients in non-quarantined rooms, in the general patient population and released back out into the general population, including a 14-year-old child who had tuberculosis and whose mother was a Registered Nurse and whose father came contact with about 500 people daily. Those patients that were quarantined were placed in isolation rooms many of which did not work because air exchange testing had not been performed on an annual basis as is required. In another instance, in 2006, a tuberculosis patient was released by a Registered Nurse to get on a bus and released into the general population.

Continue reading "Roseville Healthcare Provider Sued For Wrongful Termination, Part 5 of 8" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

In fact, both the reasons given for Ms. Smith's ultimate termination and the underlying reasons for the draft disciplinary letter which she printed from Mr. White’s screen were pretext for retaliatory action and restraint of Ms. Smith’s efforts to hold the managers in charge of Environmental, Health and Safety accountable for the numerous lapses in employee and patient safety which they have countenanced while she has worked for Foundation (first as a consultant, then as an employee).

Foundation managers expressed concerns about Ms. Smith's communication style when she would communicate that a) there were serious defects in Foundation's workplace safety program, and b) those managers were partly or fully responsible for those serious defects. Hospital workplace safety is governed by state and federal OSHA regulations, as well as other state and federal health regulations, and retaliation against an employee who voices concerns about violations of those regulations is a tortious violation of public policy as well as a violation of Labor Code Sec. 6310:

(a) No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has done any of the following:

(1) Made any oral or written complaint to the division, other governmental agencies having statutory responsibility for or assisting the division with reference to employee safety or health, his or her employer, or his or her representative.

In addition, Ms. Smith's termination was in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 1278.5:
(b)(1) No health facility shall discriminate or retaliate, in any manner, against any patient, employee, member of the medical staff, or any other health care worker of the health facility because that person has done either of the following:
(a) Presented a grievance, complaint, or report to the facility, to an entity or agency responsible for accrediting or evaluating the facility, or the medical staff of the facility, or to any other governmental entity.

Continue reading "Female Employee Sues Roseville Hospital For Wrongful Termination, Part 4 of 8" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

Foundation has a very clear national policy regarding Corrective/Disciplinary Action because it is obligated to have one. Foundation Group (FG) must comply with specific legal/regulatory standards that include, but are not limited to, those indicated by Medicare and other government program billing requirements, Guidance issued by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Compliance Program Guidance issued by the Office of the Inspector General, and HIPAA/Privacy and Security regulations .... FG is required to have well publicized disciplinary guidelines that demonstrate its commitment to compliance and set forth the consequences for violations of compliance mandates. (See, Corrective/Disciplinary Action policy, page 1.)

In other words, state and federal laws and regulations require that Foundation follow its Corrective/Disciplinary Action policy. The last paragraph of that policy states: Employees who report compliance and/or ethics concerns in good faith will not be subject to corrective/disciplinary action for doing so... Nevertheless, even assuming the truth of Foundation's purported reason for terminating Ms. Smith, Ms. Smith was terminated in violation of Foundationr's legally mandated policy because she was terminated for printing out an improperly viewable document to show to Mr. Browne. (See Part 4 of 8.)

Continue reading "Sacramento-area Hospital Sued For Workplace Discrimination, Part 3 of 8" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY AND VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE SECTION 6310 (AND HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE SECTION 1278.5)

Foundation has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims, including the major claim for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy. For settlement purposes, it is important to recognize that Foundation cannot win summary judgment or summary adjudication on this claim because of the existence of disputed issues of material fact, as well as Foundation's incorrect interpretation of the law.

The pretextual reason given for Ms. Smith's termination was her printing of a memorandum, addressed to her and publicly viewable on her supervisor's computer screen, regarding discipline that her supervisor, Scott Dawson, apparently intended to impose in retaliation for her frequent complaints about the incompetence of Foundation management and Foundation's many continuing safety and OSHA violations. At Ms. Smith's termination hearing Mr. White also falsely claimed that Ms. Smith had accessed his Lotus Notes account and printed other documents from his work computer.

Ms. Smith's termination letter referred to the following reasons for her termination: Violation of the Principle of Responsibilities, breach of confidentiality, invasion of privacy and violation of FG computer assets. (These should have been the reasons for Mr. White's termination.) Ms. Smith printed the draft disciplinary memorandum and brought it to COO Oliver Browne because of Ms. Smith’s concern that Sam White had left it visible on his screen in an open cubicle for everyone to see, thereby violating her privacy rights as an employee. The act of leaving the draft disciplinary memorandum visible for everyone to see violated Foundation's Principles of Responsibility, breached Ms. Smith's right to confidentiality of her personnel records, violated her right to privacy, and was a violation of Foundation's Electronic Assets Usage policy. Instead of properly discharging Sam White for his multiple violations of policy, Foundation, in violation of its own anti-retaliation policy, retaliated against Ms. Smith for complaining about Mr. White’s egregious violation of her confidentiality and privacy and terminated Ms. Smith instead.

Continue reading "Roseville Employee Files Wrongful Termination Action, Part 2 of 8" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

Plaintiff's Mandatory Settlement Conference Statement

Plaintiff Elaine Smith, a Workplace Safety Specialist employed at Foundation Hospital in Roseville was wrongfully terminated on January 10, 2006, in violation of public policy and Foudation's own policies. Prior to her termination, Ms. Smith was treated in an abusive and discriminatory manner by her quasi-manager, Ethan Jones, and was underpaid compared to her male counterpart at another hospital within Foundation’s North Side group. At the time of her termination, Foundation failed to return personal property to her and, despite further requests, continued to keep her personal property. To compound its injuries to Ms. Smith, her former supervisor has made false statements which wrongfully prevented Ms. Smith from obtaining subsequent employment.

It is Plaintiff's position that, for statutory and regulatory reasons, Foundation is obligated to follow its policies in terminating individuals who have otherwise made complaints about Foundation’s misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance. In Ms. Smith’s case, Foundation failed to properly follow its own policies...miserably. Not only did Foundation terminate the wrong person involved in the incident described below, but, in terminating Ms. Smith, Foundation failed to:

1) Provide any rule, guideline or policy which would indicate that the act was an offense subject to discipline or termination.
2) Provide any oral warning prior to termination.
3) Provide any written warning prior to termination.
4) Determine the actual severity of the alleged violation, determine any harm to the affected employee, or determine if there was any personal gain sought by Ms. Smith.

Continue reading "Workplace Discrimination At Sacramento-area Hospital, Part 1 of 8" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

Plaintiffs' Trial Brief on Substantial Contributing Factor; There is No Apportionment of Causation (Espinosa)MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
INTRODUCTION

This is a medical negligence action wherein the minor Plaintiff, KYLIE SMITH, suffered severe birth injuries. There will be expert testimony on the issue of causation. The defense may argue that the Plaintiffs must show by a reasonable medical probability that a defendant caused the injuries by a margin of 51%. The defense may argue that it can ask the expert to apportion the injury between factors that caused the injury. Then because the expert won't do that, the defense then claims there is no testimony as to a reasonable medical probability. This is not the current state of the law in California.

Plaintiffs are not required to quantify the percentage on causation. Plaintiffs experts need only testify whether the events were a substantial factor (BAJI No. 3.76). The inability to pin down the exact extent to which defendants' conduct contributed to the outcome is immaterial for the purposes of causation. (Espinosa v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1317-1318).) [I]t was not necessary that plaintiff prove any particular apportionment as was required by the trial court. (Id. at p. 1321.)

Continue reading "Roseville Girl Suffers Birth Injuries, Part 1 of 4" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

PLAINTIFFS' EXPERTS ARE REQUIRED TO TESTIFY ONLY AS TO WHETHER THE CAUSATION WAS A SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR - AND THEY ARE NOT REQUIRED TO QUANTIFY THE PERCENTAGE OF INJURY

Plaintiffs' experts are required only to testify whether a cause of injury is a substantial factor and this has long been the rule in California: The law defines cause in its own particular way. A cause of injury, damage, loss or harm is something that is a substantial factor in bringing about an injury, damage, loss or harm. (BAJI No. 3.76).

And as the USE NOTE states in BAJI, [t]his instruction, and the Comment thereto, were approved in Espinosa v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1314 .... (BAJI 3.76 (1997 Supp.).) This situation is almost directly on point with Espinosa. In the Espinosa case, the minor plaintiff suffered from a brain injury which had three possible contributory causes, one of which was clearly not due to the defendants' negligence.

During the presentation of the plaintiffs' case at trial, the plaintiff's expert on causation testified that there were three time frames in terms of the factors that are involved in causing this child's condition, chronic, sub-acute, and acute. (Emphasis in original.) (Id. at p. 1311.) The expert also testified that he could not quantify the extent of the interrelationship between these three time frames as a cause of plaintiff's injury. After the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence, the Court granted a non-suit because the plaintiff had not sufficiently established the element of causation between the defendants' acts and Plaintiff's brain damage.

Continue reading "Medical Malpractice Leaves Sacramento-area Girl Injured, Part 2 of 4" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

The Espinosa court also held that having demonstrated the substantial factors in causing plaintiff's brain damage, It was not necessary that plaintiff prove any particular apportionment as was required by the trial court. (Espinosa, supra. 31 Cal.App.4th.at p. 1321.)

The underlying facts of the Espinosa case are similar to the present action. Both involve indivisible injuries which were alleged to have been caused by the defendants in relation to the events surrounding the birth of the Plaintiff. Both involve experts who will not apportion the degree of damage between these points in the medical time line.

By asserting that the Plaintiffs' expert must quantify and give percentages of injury at each stage, the hospital is misstating the law and trying to manufacture a causation issue which does not exist.

The Judicial Council Task Force on Jury Instructions has published jury instructions on the issue of causation which incorporate Espinosa, Instruction 340 provides as follows:
A substantial factor is a factor that a reasonable person would consider to be a cause of the harm but is more than a trivial factor in causing it. (Jud. Council Task Force on Jury Inst. No. 340, at p. 93.)

Continue reading "Negligent Sacramento Physicians Cause Girl's Birth Injury, Part 3 of 4" »

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the proceedings.)

Consequently, Plaintiff submit Judicial Council jury instructions Numbers 340 and 341 on the issue of causation. The above instructions are in accord with BAJI: There may be more than one cause of an injury. When [[negligent] [or] [wrongful] conduct of two or more persons] [or [[negligent] [or] [wrongful] conduct and a defective product]] contribute[s] concurrently as [a] cause[s] of an injury, [the conduct of] each is a cause of the injury regardless of the extent to which such contributes to the injury. A cause is concurrent if it was operative at the moment of injury and acted with another cause to produce the injury. [It is no defense that the [negligent] [wrongful] conduct of a person not joined as a party was also a cause of the injury.] (BAJI No. 3.77.)

And the Second District Court of Appeal has the following language on the use of BAJI No. 3.77: One purpose of BAJI 3.77 is to explain to the jury that plaintiff need not prove that the defendant's negligence was the sole cause of plaintiff's injury in order to recover. Rather, it is sufficient that defendant's negligence is a legal cause of an injury, even though it operated in combination with other causes, whether tortious or non-tortious. (Logacz v. Limansky (2d Dist. 1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1158.)

Continue reading "Roseville Family Files Suit For Child's Traumatic Brain Injury, Part 4 of 4" »