DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIM

Although discovery has not been pursued with regard to this claim, Ms. Smith contends that Ethan Jones (her quasi-supervisor for a period of time because her direct supervisor rarely came to work) and Charles Green, her second level supervisor treated her differently than males in comparable positions.

More significantly, Ms. Smith’s supervisor, Sam White, who Plaintiff will testify was completely incompetent, frequently absent, and was the person who left her confidential evaluation on the computer screen was never terminated despite his incredibly poor performance.

EQUAL PAY ACT CLAIM

While Ms. Smith worked for Foundation, she suffered wage discrimination as defined by the state and federal Equal Pay Acts. Ms. Smith’s salary was very low for her position. Many others in her position were managers but she was refused that title. Plaintiff alleges that the male hired in her prior position shortly after she asked to be transferred to Rosevillewas paid $6,000 more a year than she was in that same position.
Foundation argue the reason for the pay discrepancy was the male employee's greater qualifications, but Ms. Smith will testify that the qualifications which actually applied to the job in question were equal; it was the pay that was different.

Had Ms. Smith remained at Foundsation she would have received increasing salary (including increased salary from promotions that were denied to her by her second level supervisor, Charles Green and her quasi-supervisor, Ethan Jones) for 14 years until retirement with an average increase of approx. 3%, totaling $1,262,776. Had Plaintiff received promotions, the total would be $1,528,201 assuming a salary of $95,000 a year in 2005, $1,608,632 assuming a salary of $100,000 a year in 2005 and $2,010,791 assuming a salary of $125,000 in 2005. While Ms. Smith is currently working as a temporary employee for Bayer, through an agency, this is not comparable employment. She is paid $30 an hour with no benefits. Ms. Smith’s many other attempts at gaining employment have been unsuccessful.

Benefits lost by Ms. Smith as a result of the termination are:

1) Medical and dental benefits

2) Flexible employee life ($500,000 death benefit)

3) Accidental Death Benefit

4) Long-term Disability Benefit

5) Three years build up of contribution to sick time and vacation which increases with time served.

6) The contribution to the time served would have resulted in medical benefits for life; 16 years of service gains a retiring-employee medical benefits for life.

7) The ability to contribute to a 401K that Foundation matched .50 on the dollar.

8) Two $1,000 re-imbursements for education.

9) Bonuses of 3-5% of an employee's gross salary or $2,355 - $3,925, increasing per year of service.

In addition, Ms. Smith has suffered substantial emotional distress.

Attorney fees are also compensable under Ms. Smith’s claims under the Labor Code, Health and Safety Code Section 1278.5, Equal Pay Act and FEHA.

At mediation in this case, Ms. Smith’s final demand was $850,000 and Foundation’s final offer was $55,000. Ms. Smith’s current demand is $490,000.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Exposing governmental inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable significance. As the Court noted in Connick, public employers should, as a matter of good judgment, be receptive to constructive criticism offered by their employees. 461 U.S., at 149, 103 S.Ct. 1684. The dictates of sound judgment are reinforced by the powerful network of legislative enactments-such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes-available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8); Cal. Govt.Code Ann. § 8547.8 (West 2005); Cal. Lab.Code Ann. § 1102.5 (West Supp.2006) ... These imperatives, as well as obligations arising from any other applicable constitutional provisions and mandates of the criminal and civil laws, protect employees and provide checks on supervisors who would order unlawful or otherwise inappropriate actions.

Further, Defendant's argument that Plaintiff has no legal protection for reporting illegal practices because such reporting was an essential part of her job duties turns logic and law upside down. If Defendant's position were accepted, it would mean that the very employee charged with reporting illegal activity would have no incentive to make a report because the employee would not be protected from retaliation for reporting the illegal conduct. Fortunately, and not surprisingly, California law does not abandon those employees most in need of legal protection, i.e., those who by virtue of their position must report illegal activity. See e.g. Green v. Ralee Eng. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 79 (public policy termination claim properly stated by quality control inspector who complained about unsafe conditions on airplane despite that the quality control inspector, like Plaintiff here, was simply doing his job);

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Foundation argues that Smith was terminated for legitimate reasons, cannot prove otherwise by showing that the reasons were pretext for retaliatory animus, and therefore it should prevail on summary judgment. As Smith’s claim is a state law claim for retaliation, the California Court of Appeal decision in Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 686, is directly on point. As clarified by the Mamou court, while pretext is certainly a relevant issue...the central issue...whether the evidence as a whole supports a reasoned inference that the challenged action was the product of retaliatory animus. (Id. at 715.) At the summary judgment stage, the court's duty is to determine whether the employee's evidence is too weak to sustain a reasoned inference in the employee's favor. (Id. at 718.) If reasonable competing inferences may be drawn from the facts, summary judgment should be denied. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., supra, 398 US at 157; Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. San Luis Obispo County (9th Cir. 1987) 841 F2d 872, 875.

In this case, while a jury could draw a reasoned inference that the very close proximity in time between Plaintiff's complaints and her termination was coincidental, the jury could also draw a reasoned inference that the proximity between the two acts was evidence enough of retaliatory animus. Fisher v. San Pedro (1989) 214 Cal.App. 3d 590, 615 (one may infer retaliation by the proximity in time between protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory employment decision.)

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

While working at Foundation North Side, Ms. Lane made frequent complaints to upper management, including officers and managing agents such as Oliver Browne and Ethan Jones, regarding the failure of Foundation to address serious patient and staff safety issues. None of Ms. Smith’s complaints received any substantive response, other than her termination. The subjects of these complaints included:

* OSHA violations including concerns about frequent blood splashes and gastric juices deposited on nurses and the failure of Kaiser to install necessary OSHA required eyewash stations.

* The continued use of non-safety needles to avoid accidental punctures of staff.

* Toxicity of a new facility at Richmond and a manager's withholding of the report of work that was being done to correct that toxicity found in the Forensic Analytical report commissioned by Charles Smythe to the employees in the building.

* The loss by Sam White of Personal Air Purification Respirators given to Roseville to protect staff and patients from airborne pathogens and would not find them.

* The lack of fit testing for N-95 respirators at the Roseville facility.

* The placement of tuberculosis patients in non-quarantined rooms, in the general patient population and released back out into the general population, including a 14-year-old child who had tuberculosis and whose mother was a Registered Nurse and whose father came contact with about 500 people daily. Those patients that were quarantined were placed in isolation rooms many of which did not work because air exchange testing had not been performed on an annual basis as is required. In another instance, in 2006, a tuberculosis patient was released by a Registered Nurse to get on a bus and released into the general population.

The other temporal nexus which is significant is the nexus between Ms. Smith’s termination and her December 5,2005 complaint to Oliver Browne, COO of the Roseville Medical Center, about how her chain of command, including Sam White and Ethan Jones, was ineffectual in addressing workplace safety issues. Mr. Browne responded to Ms. Smith’s initial request for assistance by requiring her to go through the same chain of command, and copying Ethan Jones on the email, thereby alerting Mr. Jones that Ms. Smith was complaining about the ineffectuality of the chain of command. Mr. Browne did nothing to investigate or prevent Ms. Smith’s subsequent termination for wrongful reasons. See Coszalter v. City of Salem (9th Cir.2003) 320 F.3d 968, 977 (employee can show that complaints were a substantial motivating factor in an adverse employment action by introducing evidence regarding the proximity in time between his speech and the allegedly retaliatory action); See also Lujan v. Minagar (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th.1040, 1046 (wrongful termination under Labor Code Sec. 6310 includes preemptive retaliation against employees whom an employer fears will file workplace safety complaints). (See Part 6 of 8.)

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

In fact, both the reasons given for Ms. Smith's ultimate termination and the underlying reasons for the draft disciplinary letter which she printed from Mr. White’s screen were pretext for retaliatory action and restraint of Ms. Smith’s efforts to hold the managers in charge of Environmental, Health and Safety accountable for the numerous lapses in employee and patient safety which they have countenanced while she has worked for Foundation (first as a consultant, then as an employee).

Foundation managers expressed concerns about Ms. Smith's communication style when she would communicate that a) there were serious defects in Foundation's workplace safety program, and b) those managers were partly or fully responsible for those serious defects. Hospital workplace safety is governed by state and federal OSHA regulations, as well as other state and federal health regulations, and retaliation against an employee who voices concerns about violations of those regulations is a tortious violation of public policy as well as a violation of Labor Code Sec. 6310:

(a) No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has done any of the following:

(1) Made any oral or written complaint to the division, other governmental agencies having statutory responsibility for or assisting the division with reference to employee safety or health, his or her employer, or his or her representative.

In addition, Ms. Smith's termination was in violation of Health and Safety Code Section 1278.5:
(b)(1) No health facility shall discriminate or retaliate, in any manner, against any patient, employee, member of the medical staff, or any other health care worker of the health facility because that person has done either of the following:
(a) Presented a grievance, complaint, or report to the facility, to an entity or agency responsible for accrediting or evaluating the facility, or the medical staff of the facility, or to any other governmental entity.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Foundation has a very clear national policy regarding Corrective/Disciplinary Action because it is obligated to have one. Foundation Group (FG) must comply with specific legal/regulatory standards that include, but are not limited to, those indicated by Medicare and other government program billing requirements, Guidance issued by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Compliance Program Guidance issued by the Office of the Inspector General, and HIPAA/Privacy and Security regulations .... FG is required to have well publicized disciplinary guidelines that demonstrate its commitment to compliance and set forth the consequences for violations of compliance mandates. (See, Corrective/Disciplinary Action policy, page 1.)

In other words, state and federal laws and regulations require that Foundation follow its Corrective/Disciplinary Action policy. The last paragraph of that policy states: Employees who report compliance and/or ethics concerns in good faith will not be subject to corrective/disciplinary action for doing so... Nevertheless, even assuming the truth of Foundation's purported reason for terminating Ms. Smith, Ms. Smith was terminated in violation of Foundationr's legally mandated policy because she was terminated for printing out an improperly viewable document to show to Mr. Browne. (See Part 4 of 8.)

WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY AND VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE SECTION 6310 (AND HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE SECTION 1278.5)

Foundation has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims, including the major claim for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy. For settlement purposes, it is important to recognize that Foundation cannot win summary judgment or summary adjudication on this claim because of the existence of disputed issues of material fact, as well as Foundation's incorrect interpretation of the law.

The pretextual reason given for Ms. Smith's termination was her printing of a memorandum, addressed to her and publicly viewable on her supervisor's computer screen, regarding discipline that her supervisor, Scott Dawson, apparently intended to impose in retaliation for her frequent complaints about the incompetence of Foundation management and Foundation's many continuing safety and OSHA violations. At Ms. Smith's termination hearing Mr. White also falsely claimed that Ms. Smith had accessed his Lotus Notes account and printed other documents from his work computer.

Ms. Smith's termination letter referred to the following reasons for her termination: Violation of the Principle of Responsibilities, breach of confidentiality, invasion of privacy and violation of FG computer assets. (These should have been the reasons for Mr. White's termination.) Ms. Smith printed the draft disciplinary memorandum and brought it to COO Oliver Browne because of Ms. Smith’s concern that Sam White had left it visible on his screen in an open cubicle for everyone to see, thereby violating her privacy rights as an employee. The act of leaving the draft disciplinary memorandum visible for everyone to see violated Foundation's Principles of Responsibility, breached Ms. Smith's right to confidentiality of her personnel records, violated her right to privacy, and was a violation of Foundation's Electronic Assets Usage policy. Instead of properly discharging Sam White for his multiple violations of policy, Foundation, in violation of its own anti-retaliation policy, retaliated against Ms. Smith for complaining about Mr. White’s egregious violation of her confidentiality and privacy and terminated Ms. Smith instead.

The violations of Foundation's Electronic Usage Policy were by Sam White:
a. He failed to prevent access to his computer.
b. He failed to avoid leaving...business information open/accessible by employing password-activated screen savers.

And, yet, Mr. White received no discipline whatsoever. Interestingly, Foundation's Electronic Assets Usage policy also states Users who identify security issues should report them immediately. In Smith’s case, that line should be followed by ...and subsequently be terminated. (See Part 3 of 8.)

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Plaintiff's Mandatory Settlement Conference Statement

Plaintiff Elaine Smith, a Workplace Safety Specialist employed at Foundation Hospital in Roseville was wrongfully terminated on January 10, 2006, in violation of public policy and Foudation's own policies. Prior to her termination, Ms. Smith was treated in an abusive and discriminatory manner by her quasi-manager, Ethan Jones, and was underpaid compared to her male counterpart at another hospital within Foundation’s North Side group. At the time of her termination, Foundation failed to return personal property to her and, despite further requests, continued to keep her personal property. To compound its injuries to Ms. Smith, her former supervisor has made false statements which wrongfully prevented Ms. Smith from obtaining subsequent employment.

It is Plaintiff's position that, for statutory and regulatory reasons, Foundation is obligated to follow its policies in terminating individuals who have otherwise made complaints about Foundation’s misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance. In Ms. Smith’s case, Foundation failed to properly follow its own policies...miserably. Not only did Foundation terminate the wrong person involved in the incident described below, but, in terminating Ms. Smith, Foundation failed to:

1) Provide any rule, guideline or policy which would indicate that the act was an offense subject to discipline or termination.
2) Provide any oral warning prior to termination.
3) Provide any written warning prior to termination.
4) Determine the actual severity of the alleged violation, determine any harm to the affected employee, or determine if there was any personal gain sought by Ms. Smith.

Most importantly, the person who terminated Ms. Smith, Sam White, contradicted himself regarding the reason for Ms. Smith’s termination. Initially he claimed that the reason was her printing of the document from his computer screen; later he claimed it was because she couldn't get along with anyone. (See Part 2 of 8.)

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Plaintiffs' Trial Brief on Substantial Contributing Factor; There is No Apportionment of Causation (Espinosa)MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
INTRODUCTION

This is a medical negligence action wherein the minor Plaintiff, KYLIE SMITH, suffered severe birth injuries. There will be expert testimony on the issue of causation. The defense may argue that the Plaintiffs must show by a reasonable medical probability that a defendant caused the injuries by a margin of 51%. The defense may argue that it can ask the expert to apportion the injury between factors that caused the injury. Then because the expert won't do that, the defense then claims there is no testimony as to a reasonable medical probability. This is not the current state of the law in California.

Plaintiffs are not required to quantify the percentage on causation. Plaintiffs experts need only testify whether the events were a substantial factor (BAJI No. 3.76). The inability to pin down the exact extent to which defendants' conduct contributed to the outcome is immaterial for the purposes of causation. (Espinosa v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1317-1318).) [I]t was not necessary that plaintiff prove any particular apportionment as was required by the trial court. (Id. at p. 1321.)

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PLAINTIFFS' EXPERTS ARE REQUIRED TO TESTIFY ONLY AS TO WHETHER THE CAUSATION WAS A SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR - AND THEY ARE NOT REQUIRED TO QUANTIFY THE PERCENTAGE OF INJURY

Plaintiffs' experts are required only to testify whether a cause of injury is a substantial factor and this has long been the rule in California: The law defines cause in its own particular way. A cause of injury, damage, loss or harm is something that is a substantial factor in bringing about an injury, damage, loss or harm. (BAJI No. 3.76).

And as the USE NOTE states in BAJI, [t]his instruction, and the Comment thereto, were approved in Espinosa v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1314 .... (BAJI 3.76 (1997 Supp.).) This situation is almost directly on point with Espinosa. In the Espinosa case, the minor plaintiff suffered from a brain injury which had three possible contributory causes, one of which was clearly not due to the defendants' negligence.

During the presentation of the plaintiffs' case at trial, the plaintiff's expert on causation testified that there were three time frames in terms of the factors that are involved in causing this child's condition, chronic, sub-acute, and acute. (Emphasis in original.) (Id. at p. 1311.) The expert also testified that he could not quantify the extent of the interrelationship between these three time frames as a cause of plaintiff's injury. After the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence, the Court granted a non-suit because the plaintiff had not sufficiently established the element of causation between the defendants' acts and Plaintiff's brain damage.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

The Espinosa court also held that having demonstrated the substantial factors in causing plaintiff's brain damage, It was not necessary that plaintiff prove any particular apportionment as was required by the trial court. (Espinosa, supra. 31 Cal.App.4th.at p. 1321.)

The underlying facts of the Espinosa case are similar to the present action. Both involve indivisible injuries which were alleged to have been caused by the defendants in relation to the events surrounding the birth of the Plaintiff. Both involve experts who will not apportion the degree of damage between these points in the medical time line.

By asserting that the Plaintiffs' expert must quantify and give percentages of injury at each stage, the hospital is misstating the law and trying to manufacture a causation issue which does not exist.

The Judicial Council Task Force on Jury Instructions has published jury instructions on the issue of causation which incorporate Espinosa, Instruction 340 provides as follows:
A substantial factor is a factor that a reasonable person would consider to be a cause of the harm but is more than a trivial factor in causing it. (Jud. Council Task Force on Jury Inst. No. 340, at p. 93.)

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Consequently, Plaintiff submit Judicial Council jury instructions Numbers 340 and 341 on the issue of causation. The above instructions are in accord with BAJI: There may be more than one cause of an injury. When [[negligent] [or] [wrongful] conduct of two or more persons] [or [[negligent] [or] [wrongful] conduct and a defective product]] contribute[s] concurrently as [a] cause[s] of an injury, [the conduct of] each is a cause of the injury regardless of the extent to which such contributes to the injury. A cause is concurrent if it was operative at the moment of injury and acted with another cause to produce the injury. [It is no defense that the [negligent] [wrongful] conduct of a person not joined as a party was also a cause of the injury.] (BAJI No. 3.77.)

And the Second District Court of Appeal has the following language on the use of BAJI No. 3.77: One purpose of BAJI 3.77 is to explain to the jury that plaintiff need not prove that the defendant's negligence was the sole cause of plaintiff's injury in order to recover. Rather, it is sufficient that defendant's negligence is a legal cause of an injury, even though it operated in combination with other causes, whether tortious or non-tortious. (Logacz v. Limansky (2d Dist. 1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1158.)

Consequently, by all relevant California authorities Plaintiffs do not have to apportion causation among the various defendants. The above jury instructions are accurate and the Court should not instruct the jury that apportionment of causation is required.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Defendant driver, Bobbi Jones, had driven this trip 17 of the 19 years that it had taken place, and prior to this year she had never had a problem. This year, however, despite all the problems that defendant driver caused, she still believed her driving was up to par. In her deposition taken on May 15, 2007, she testified:

“Q. Now, in the other 16 years you drove, do you recall making any driver error?
A. No.
[objection omitted]
Q. MR. COLLINS: Do you recall leaving the lights on and letting the battery run dead?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall damaging the bus?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall - - in the other 16 years you drove do you recall hitting a pole?
A. No.
Q. Do you recall hitting anything?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you recall causing the bus to - - the group to run late as a result of anything you did in the other 16 years?
A. No, sir.
Q. But you did on the 17th year?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you think that based on that you were not fully up to par on this 17th year?
A. No.
[objection omitted]
THE WITNESS: I was up to par.
Q. MR. COLLINS: Okay. How do you explain, though, that on the 17th year you had those problems that you never had in the first 16 years?
A. I have no idea, sir.”
(Depo. Bobbi Jones, pp. 47:3-48:9)

Bobbi Jones further testified:

“Q. Okay. Now, a car pulled in front of you, right?
A. More like cut me off.
Q. Okay. And what did you do in response to that?
A. Well, when I noticed it happening, I tapped my brakes.
Q. Okay. That’s your memory, that you tapped your brakes?
A. Yes.
Q. Because you have been trained not to apply - - you’ve been trained not to slam your brakes on?
A. Been trained that way, yeah.
Q. And tell me why you have been trained not to slam on your brakes?
A. Because if you slam your brakes, everybody is going to go forward.
Q. Right. And if anyone is standing up they could fall and be injured?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Plus, you may have problems with the cars behind you?
A. Yes. Chain reaction type thing, yes.”
(Depo. of bobi jones, pg.21:3-23)

“Q. Okay. If you had slammed on your brakes, that would have been a mistake?
A. Yes.
Q. That would have been a driver error?
A. Yes.
Q. That would have been dangerous?

Although Ms. Jones testified that she was “cut off” by another car, she denies slamming on her brakes. Further, Ms. Jones concedes it is wrong and dangerous for a bus driver to slam on the brakes.

Almost every other witness has testified that Ms. Jones did slam on the brakes. Those additional witness statements are available to the defense.

VIII. SETTLEMENT OFFER
This is not a case in which defendants should have used reasonable care. Here, defendants are held to a much higher standard. Defendants should have used the “utmost care.”

Both the bus company and JONES failed to use the utmost care when carrying its passengers. The bus company is liable and responsible for sending JONES to drive in her compromised health condition. The defendant bus company is also vicariously liable for JONES’ poor driving and unnecessarily slamming on the brakes. Plaintiff was catastrophically injured as a result.

Plaintiff NANCY KLEIN remains catastrophically disabled and still suffers daily with shortness of breath. She is unable to do the required tasks on the farm she used to do before the incident on the bus. She is still receiving significant medical treatment for her injuries, and she still requires daily medications.

As itemized above, plaintiff’s provable special damages are $737,784. Plaintiff hereby offers to settle her case for $1,875,000, or for defendant bus company’s policy limits of coverage, whichever is less. In exchange, plaintiff will provide defendants with a full release and plaintiff will extinguish all liens.

Trial is scheduled for August 18, 2007.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

2. Olivia Stark further testified about all the incidents caused by defendant JONES:

“Q. After Bobbi slammed on the brakes the first time, did you overhear any kind of complaints about her driving?
A. By the end of the trip, people were starting to wonder.
Q. Can you tell me what people were saying?
A. They were talking about the number of incidents we had this trip, and calling
it ‘the bus trip from hell.’
Q. And the incidents that you refer to are the two times she slammed on the
brakes, and the other time when she - -
A. The windows.
Q. - - the windows?
A. Yes.
Q. Anything else?
MR. COLLINS: She testified to the bus trip delay because the driver left the lights on.
Q. BY MS. LI: Other than the lights, the windows, and the two braking incidents, was there anything unusual about the trip that stood out?
A. That was enough.”
(Depo. of Olivia Stark, pp.28:22-29:18)
Mr. Stark, an experienced bus driver, testified that defendant JONES was not focused as a bus driver on this trip.

“Q. And in fact, you rode with her the first year, and she drove like an experienced bus driver?
A. Yes.
Q. This year, when Nanacy got hurt, she wasn’t driving as well as she drove before, true?
A. True.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

On October 19, 2006, Tim Stark and Olivia Stark were deposed. Their condensed depositions are referenced herein. Mr. and Mrs. Stark were passengers on the bus trip. Mr. Stark is a licensed, experienced bus driver, and he was seated directly behind defendant JONES when the incident occurred. Mr. and Mrs. STARK testified that JONES slammed on the brakes too hard, causing NANCY to fall:

Q. And you’re a bus driver?
A. I’ve been one, yes.
Q. You’re qualified to drive a bus?
A. Yes.
(Depo. of Tim Stark, pp.35:25-36:3)

“A. That would be when a car pulled in front of us, and Bobbi slammed on the brakes and Nancy fell.”
(Depo. of Olivia Stark, pp. 15: 12-13)

“A. In other words, I’ve been driving for years. The front of the bus dipped down fairly severely because he braked so hard.”
(Depo. of Tim Stark, pp. 24:14-16)

“Q. And so you’re sitting right behind the driver that morning, and you see this whole thing unfold ahead of you, and see Bobbi slam the brakes, right?
A. Yes.
Q. She could have lightly put on the brakes, and the car would have passed in front of the bus without incident?
A. Yes.”
(Depo. of Tim Stark, pp. 36:18-37:3)

1. On the first day of the trip, defendant Bobbi Jones parked the bus with the lights on,
causing a two-hour delay. Mr. Stark testified as follows:

“Q. Now, do you think there was about a two-hour delay getting started that morning?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you recall the reason for that delay?
A. Because the bus had been - - was there before I got there, and apparently, it had been parked with the lights on.
Q. Would that have been the bus driver’s responsibility?
A. Yes.”
(Depo. of Tim Stark, pp. 34:4-13)

2. On the second day of the trip, defendant Jones blew out two of the windows in the bus, making it inoperable to carry passengers, and had to get a replacement bus. Olivia Stark testified:

“Q. Was there anything unusual about his driving for the remainder of the trip?
A. Well, we had a lot of incidents this trip.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. Well, we had where we had to put on brakes heavily, she popped the windows out on the bus.”
(Depo. of Olivia Stark, pp. 19:24-20:4)

Q. And shortly after that, she ran the bus into a sign?
A. Yes.
Q. And blew out the windows in the bus?
A. Yes.”
(Depo. of Olivia Stark, pp. 26:5-9)

Mr. Stark testified:

“Q. And the reason you got the new bus, as you understand, because the old bus had been so damaged by Bobbi?
A. Because they claimed that the law prohibited them from having us on the bus. So they gave us another bus.”
(Depo. of Tim Stark, pp. 38:8-13)

3. Defendant Jones missed a road to a farm on their bus trip. Instead of slowing down the bus and turning around, he again slammed on the brakes. Mrs. Stark stated in her deposition:

“Q. Did she step on the brakes suddenly after this incident that we’ve been talking about?
A. Yes she did.
Q. And can you tell me about that, where was it and when was it?
A. Out in the middle of nowhere, we were looking for a farm and she had passed the road, and pretty much slammed on her brake.
(Depo. of Olivia Stark, pp. 20:5-16) (See Part 5 of 6.)

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.