(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury case and its proceedings.)

The Notice was submitted on February 8, 2001, and was incorporated into the Plan approved by the Bankruptcy Court. The Supplement attached to the Notice lists the specific steps the various entities took during the reorganization process. With regard to the California properties, the following reorganization took place, which can be traced in Item l3 as follows:

B. 3: AMS Properties, Inc., which operated three of the defendant dbas, merged with and into GCI-Wisconsin Properties, Inc., a subsidiary of SunCare, Inc., with GCIWisconsin Properties, Inc. being the survivor after the merger.
D. 1: SunCare, Inc. converted from a C corporation to a Delaware limited liability company and changed its name to SunCare, LLC.

These additional documents clearly establish the relationship between the Ocean Group and SunCare, LLC, and its various dba's, the named defendants in the present law suit.

The reorganization process, as outlined in the Plan Documentary Supplement, is further authenticated by the Declaration of Daniel Smith, a Senior Vice President and Associate Counsel for Ocean Healthcare Management Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Ocean Health Care, Inc., previously known as Ocean Post-Acute Network, Inc.

The general rule that grounds for motion to strike must appear on the face of a pleading is subject to certain exceptions. As consistently recognized by California courts, in cases where a motion is supported by facts outside the pleadings, the court may treat the motion as a speaking motion and, therefore, take such evidence into consideration. For instance, in City and County of San Francisco v. Strahlendorf (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1911, 1913-14, the First District Court of Appeal held:

When faced with situations similar to this, other courts have interpreted procedurally deficient motions as speaking motion[s] to dismiss or strike. (See Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 167-169 ...;Christian v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 466, 468...) Essentially, a speaking motion is one which is supported by facts outside the pleadings, such as a declaration. (Ibid.) Modernly, a speaking motion is treated as a motion for summary judgment. (Ibid.)
Thus interpreted, the issue in this case is whether the evidence before the trial court was sufficient to compel summary judgment in favor of respondent.

Similarly, in Mediterranean Exports, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Mateo County (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 605, the court acknowledged that extensive evidentiary showing on a motion to strike made the motion a speaking motion which had to be treated and tested as if it were a motion for summary judgment.

The documentary evidence, i.e., documents filed with the bankruptcy court and further authenticated by the declaration of Mr. Smith, is more than sufficient to support Defendants' argument that the named Defendants in this action are debtor affiliates subject to the bankruptcy reorganization and protected by the release of all claims arising from conduct prior to the Confirmation Date of April 8, 2001. Hence, all pre-Confirmation Date restitution claims must be stricken from the Complaint.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court strike Plaintiff's claims for restitution consistent with the grounds set forth above.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury case and its proceedings.)

(C) Sufficient Documentation of the Bankruptcy Reorganization Exists to Support Defendants' Argument for Striking All Restitution Claims Arising Out of Conduct Preceding the Confirmation Date of the Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization

As noted in Defendants' moving papers, Ocean Health Care, Inc., Ocean Post-Acute Network, Inc., Ocean Health Group, Inc., and their respective debtor affiliates, filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 18, 2000. Ocean Group confirmed the Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization for the Ocean Post-Acute Network, Inc., the Ocean Health Group, Inc., and Their Respective Debtor Affiliates Dated February 1, 2001 (as Or L Modified on March 25, 2001 for Confirmation) ("the Plan") pursuant to confirmation orders dated April 3, 2001.

On May 13, 2001, the effective day of the Plan, the Ocean Group, its debtor affiliates and all successors in interest, received the discharge injunction imposed by Section IX.D of the Plan, the Bankruptcy Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Confirming Debtors' Joint Plan of Reorganization.

1. Notice of Filing Plan Documentary Supplement to Debtors' Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization ("Notice"); and
2. Plan Documentary Supplement Item #13 thereto, entitled Draft Memorandum and Chart Outlining Corporate Restructuring Program ("Supplement"). (See Part 6 of 6.)

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Restitution Is Not An Appropriate Remedy for Medi-Cal or Medicare Patients

Defendants also contend that Plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, seek restitution on behalf of those residents who receive Medi-Cal and Medicare benefits. Any party seeking to restore federal funds must do so through the federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. Similarly, individuals seeking to restore state funds based upon false claims must proceed under the California False Claims Act, Government Code §§ 12650-12656.

As to EF's argument that Medi-Cal is akin to a loan in which Residents have an ownership interest, this argument was soundly rejected by the California Supreme Court in Kizer v. Hanna (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1. The court held, as part of a retroactivity analysis, that there is no debt created by recoupment scheme of Welfare & Institutions Code Section 14009.5. EF is, therefor, simply wrong in its bootstrap assertion that nursing home residents incur a liability at the time Medi-Cal makes payments on their behalf and that the residents, therefore, have an ownership interest in the money. To the contrary, as explained in Hanna, "the payment of Medi-Cal does not create a debt under section 14009.5, because the Department's right to reimbursement arises only after the recipient's death and even then is contingent upon conditions in existence at that time." Id., at 11. As noted in Defendants' moving papers, Section 14009.5 clearly states that there is no right to reimbursement if the recipient leaves a surviving spouse, a minor or disabled child, or an insufficient estate.

Most significantly, the estate recovery program is intended to permit the Medi-Cal program to recoup funds for the California government. It does not mean that the deceased beneficiary has (or had) any property rights in these funds. As the California Supreme Court explained in Kizer, Section 14009.5 enables Medi-Cal to help those persons in need when they have such need, yet ensures that when the need no longer exists by virtue of the recipient's death, the benefits paid can be recouped. The Medi-Cal benefits thus recouped can be used to assist others in need. Kizer, at 6. Nothing in this system evidences a legislative intent to create any property rights in Medi-Cal beneficiaries. Instead, Welfare & Institutions Code §14002 expressly negates any contractual right to receive Medi-Cal benefits. Moreover, as courts have previously explained, Medicaid recipients do not have a property interest in their Medicaid program participation sufficient to even state private rights of action against providers for violations of Medi-Cal requirements. See, e.g., Stewart v. Bernstein (5th Cir. 1985) 769 F.2d 1088, 1094. Based on the above, it is clear that Medi-Cal recipients cannot possibly have an ownership interest in money they never received or paid. Plaintiff's claim for restitution on behalf of Medi-Cal recipients must, therefore, be stricken. (See Part 5 of 6.)

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury case and its proceedings.)

Further, as we had previously noted, EF makes no allegations of any negative impact on any specific resident caused by the alleged under staffing and, thereby, fails to show a causal link between an individual resident's specific needs and the services received, regardless of the nursing hours supplied at that time. This is clearly inconsistent with DHS's enforcement policies as stated in their policy guidelines for enforcing the staffing level requirements.

Equally significant is the fact that, by merely asserting a lump sum amount that Defendants allegedly should have ... spent on staffing, and suggesting that amount should be distributed to residents without linking inadequate staffing to any allegations of specific incidents of fewer than 3.2 hours of service for a patient on a particular day, or allegations of harm suffered by individual residents, EF is in fact seeking disgorgement - a remedy clearly not allowed under Section 17200. In contrast to restitution, the remedy of disgorgement is available only in certified class actions and not in a representative action brought by a private party under the UCL. Kraus, supra, at 126-127; see, also, Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1148-50.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury case and its proceedings.)

LEGAL ARGUMENT

(A) Restitution Is Not An Appropriate Remedy in This Case

When EF set out to attack the nursing home industry under the guise of consumer protection, it initially attempted to link its broad and unsupported allegations of understaffing with potential negative patient outcomes based on certain studies. However, EF has never alleged that any resident received fewer than 3.2 hours of nursing care on any particular day or that the residents in Petitioner's long-term care facilities have suffered any adverse care outcomes as a result of the alleged failure to comply with the staffing requirements stated in Health & Safety §1276.5. Instead, EF acknowledged that it "planned to develop" the information to support more specific allegations of adverse patient outcome through discovery. That is, EF has pursued an intentional course of action to make broad, conclusory allegations first and attempt to develop the facts to support such allegations through discovery fishing expeditions later.

EF's complaint against the SunCare defendants ("Complaint") presents the request for restitution without identifying the interests of a single resident. The Complaint is entirely devoid of any allegations that any particular resident received fewer than 3.2 nursing hours of services on any given day. Nowhere does EF explain "the nature of the vested interest" that such individuals might have in monies to be restored under Business and Professions Code Section 17203.

Further, Defendants maintain that EF failed to identify how the amount to be restored to residents might be calculated and distributed. In order to enter a restitution order in this case, a court would have to conduct mini-trials for every resident at Defendants' facilities during the pertinent time period. Such an inquiry is simply not appropriate in any Section 17200 action and certainly not appropriate in this action. See, e.g., Bronco Wine Co. v. Frank A. Logoluso Farms (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 699. Although a defendant can be ordered to use reasonable means to identify, locate and repay individuals who would qualify for restitution (Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 116, 138), the court's task in the present case would involve far more than reasonable means. Moreover, it is Defendants' position that such calculations cannot be made, given the nature of nursing care where care is provided to patients with different care needs at different times. (See Part 3 of 6.)

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

(Please note: the names and locations of all parties have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the participants in this personal injury case and its proceedings.)

DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE

INTRODUCTION

In a dismissive 2 1/2- page document, Plaintiff ELDER FOUNDATION ("Plaintiff" or "EF") objects to the Motion to Strike Restitution Claim filed by Defendants SunCare, LLC, et al. ("Defendants" or "SunCare") on the grounds that the issues raised by Defendants have been ruled on by this Court and that the motion raises no new arguments with regard to Section III A (restitution not an available remedy) and B (restitution inappropriate for Medi-Cal/Medicare patients). Plaintiff, therefore, ostensibly acting in the interest of judicial economy, simply incorporates its opposition to the Covenant Care and Health Care motions previously heard by this Court and asks the Court to come to the same conclusion it did with regard to these motions.

As to Defendants' Section III C argument that claims arising out of actions that occurred during Defendants' bankruptcy reorganization are barred, Plaintiff asserts that because the argument is supported by a declaration, the Court must deny the motion.

Plaintiff's blase treatment of SunCare's motion ignores not only the additional arguments made by Defendants to support both its demurrer and the motion to strike the restitution claim, but fails to acknowledge that a declaration can be used under certain circumstances.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

e. The PlaintifFs Should Have the Benefit of Delayed Accrual of the Elder Abuse Claims.

The principal purpose of the rule permitting postponed accrual of certain causes of action is to protect aggrieved parties who, with justification, are ignorant of their right to sue. [Seelenfreund v. Terminix of Northern Calif., Inc., supra, 84 Cal. App. 3d at 138, see Leaf v. City of San Mateo (1980) 104 Cal. App. 3d 398, 406, the rule applies where it is manifestly unjust to deprive plaintiffs of a cause of action before they are aware that they have been injured Two common themes support the delayed discovery rule:

First, the discovery rule is applied to actions in which it is generally difficult for plaintiffs to immediately detect or comprehend the breach or the resulting injuries (e.g., where the cause or injuries are hidden). [E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 CA4th 1308, 1318] Second, courts have relied on the nature of the relationship between defendant and plaintiff to explain application of the delayed accrual rule (e.g., where confidential or fiduciary relationships are involved). [See Parsons v. Tkkner (1995) 31 CA4th 1513, 1526]

In this case the plaintiffs had to learn about why Paul Steinford died. They could not learn it from the medical records alone but rather had to have an expert interpret those for them. This is exactly the circumstances where the court can develop the rule to achieve justice.
The common law discovery rule, where applicable, indefinitely delays accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably has cause to discover the facts constituting it.

f. The Plaintiffs Will Amend to Show the Other Daughter of Paul Steinford (Phoebe Steinford) as a Defendant.

A request was made of Phoebe Steinford to join as a plaintiff. She has not and shall be joined as a defendant.

CONCLUSION

The plaintiffs claims should be allowed to proceed. And the demurrers should be overruled.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

d. The Doctors Are Accused by Sufficiently Allegations of Reckless Neglect Under the Elder Abuse Act.

To establish elder abuse a plaintiff must show a defendant was guilty of recklessness, among other possibilities. [Benun v. Sup.Ct. (Country Villa East)] (2004) 123 Cal. App. 4th 113, 120] Then the controlling statute of limitations is for personal injury, hence two years. [Ibid]

The Second Cause of Action states that the doctors were reckless and showed a deliberate disregard of a high probability that injury would occur. That is recklessness. [Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 990, 1019 (citing other cases)]
In 1991, in order to enable interested persons to engage attorneys to take up the cause of abused elderly persons and dependent adults (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600, subd. (j)), the Legislature added Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657 to the Act.

That section makes available, to plaintiffs who prove especially egregious elder abuse to a high standard, certain remedies in addition to all other remedies otherwise provided by law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657). [1] Specifically, a plaintiff who proves by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant is liable for physical abuse, neglect, or financial abuse (as these terms are defined in the Act), and that the defendant has been guilty of recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice in the commission of such abuse, may recover attorney fees and costs. (Id., subd. (a), incorporating by reference Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15610.30, 15610.57, 15610.63.)
Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (Inclan) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 779-780.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Tina Steinford, a distraught daughter of Paul Steinford, decided that her father should not have suffered and died but only could guess why. She did not have any material facts; did not have any medical records until April 2007; could not afford hiring a qualified doctor to investigate; and has no training in medicine or nursing. Her father was 84 years old, so a reasonable person does not normally suspect wrong doing or premature death.

She did not know and the medical records did not disclose the known side effects of the psychotropic drugs administered. Rather, those records refer to failures of the respiratory system, failure of the kidneys, sepsis and, unltimately, heart failure. Upset and too poor to pay for professionals, she continuously sought help but did not find it until after she contacted the Citizens Commission on Human Rights. A referral from that group to this counsel lead to the prompt involvement of a doctor that understands that psychotropic drugs poison older people. That immediately lead to the filing of this lawsuit.

The history of the delayed discovery rule preceding the passage of me three year outer limit in 1975 evidenced the possibility that the commencement of the running of the statute might be deferred indefinitely. [Brown v. Bleiberg (1982) 32 Cal. 3d 426, 432] And so in the Brown case a woman that had a foot surgery for corns sued her doctor twelve years later because unknown to her he removed bones.

c. The Plaintiffs Could Not Have Filed a Lawsuit until a Lawyer Was Convinced of a Factual Basis.

Every lawyer that files a lawsuit must keep in mind that pursuing a claim for profit (either an hourly or contingent fee) they might be held responsible for a malicious lawsuit if they don't have a tenable claim at the inception. Fundamentally, the attorney must be able to later make a facially sufficient evidentiary showing to avoid potential liability. That is because one of the elements of an action for malicious prosecution is the absence of probable cause for bringing the prior action. [Sheldon Appel v. Alpert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal. 3d 863, 874]

No reasonable lawyer will commence a lawsuit against a doctor without a competent medical opinion.
[N]egligence on the part of a physician or surgeon will not be presumed; it must be affirmatively proved. On the contrary, in the absence of expert evidence, it will be presumed that a physician or surgeon exercised the ordinary skill and care required of him in treating his patient.
Engelking v. Carlson (1939) 13 Cal. 2d 216, 220.

Thus, the lawsuit could not have been commenced until actually filed in this case. (See Part 7 of 8.)

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Toyota's president emerged from seclusion Friday to apologize and address criticism that the automaker mishandled a crisis over sticking gas pedals. Yet he stopped short of ordering a recall for the company's iconic Prius hybrid for braking problems.

Akio Toyoda, appointed to the top job at Toyota Motor Corp. last June, promised to beef up quality control, saying, "We are facing a crisis."

Toyoda, grandson of the company's founder, said he personally would head a special committee to review checks within the company, go over consumer complaints and listen to outside experts to come up with a fix.

"I apologize from the bottom of my heart for all the concern that we have given to so many customers," said Toyoda, speaking at his first news conference since the Jan. 21 global recall of 4.5 million vehicles.

"Toyota needs to be more assertive in terms of providing consumers comfort that the immediate problem is being addressed ... and that it can deal with these crises," said Sherman Abe, a business professor at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo.

It took prodding from the U.S. government for Toyota to recall the vehicles, about half of them in North America, for gas pedals that can stick and cause sudden acceleration.

Asked if he should have acted more quickly, Toyoda replied in hesitant English: "I will do my best."

Toyoda was the second successive Toyota president to offer an apology for defects in the company's cars. The first, Katsuaki Watanabe, shocked a news conference in 2006, bowing low to the group before promising to improve quality.

Prius drivers in Japan and the U.S. have complained of a short delay before the brakes kick in -- a flaw Toyota says can be fixed with a software programming change. The lag occurs as the car is switching between brakes for the gas engine and the electric motor -- a process that is key to the hybrid's increased mileage.

Toyota spokesman Mike Michels said Friday the company continues to weigh options on how to handle repair of the problem, and it is communicating with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

Finally, in 2007, after searching diligently to find help to review the suspected claim, Ms. Steinford found her present counsel who agreed to review the matter, and upon reading the records helped retain a competent physician who expeditiously reviewed the records, an opinion was rendered of negligence such that current counsel could on May 2, 2007, for the first time properly issue notices pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 364.

Prior to the actions undertaken by current counsel Ms. Steinford did not have knowledge about the negligent causation ofher father's death sufficient to bring an action sounding in medical negligence or elder abuse. Based upon these facts the statute of limitations for both medical negligence and elder abuse based upon medical negligence should be equitably tolled to allow this action to proceed or in the alternative the defendants should be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations because of the false explanation of the course of death.

In addition to these facts alleged to show diligent pursuit of the factual basis to bring a claim, in this brief the plaintiffs also say:

This case is about the poisoning of Paul Steinford by means of multiple psycho tropic drugs that should never have been used but certainly should have been stopped when the symptoms started that lead to his death. Many of those symptoms are disclosed by the drug companies as side effects of the psycho tropic drugs. All of the treating doctors should have known that the drugs had those known side effects that included symptoms that Mr. Steinford exhibited to them including difficulty swallowing and toxicity.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

The legislature, in codifying the discovery rule, has also required plaintiffs to pursue their claims diligently by making accrual of a cause of action contingent on when a party discovered or should have discovered that his or her injury had a wrongful cause. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc, §§ 340.1, subd. (a) [ within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered ], 340.15, subd. (a)(2) [ [w]ithin three years from the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered ], 340.2, subd. (a)(2) [ [w]ithin one year after the date the plaintiff either knew, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known ], 340.5 [ one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered ].)

This policy of charging plaintiffs with presumptive knowledge of the wrongful cause of an injury is consistent with our general policy encouraging plaintiffs to pursue their claims diligently. (Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 395.)

Simply put, in order to employ the discovery rule to delay accrual of a cause of action, a potential plaintiff who suspects that an injury has been wrongfully caused must conduct a reasonable investigation of all potential causes of that injury.

The plaintiffs have pleaded just those facts. They said:

In order to appreciate the negligent cause of Mr. Steinford's death, one must have medical training. The factors involved are complex and beyond the understanding of common people. Moreover the medical records did not reveal the actual cause of the death of Mr. Steinford, but rather masked it by reference to wrong explanations. Only an experienced doctor could have ferreted through the medical records to figure out why Mr. Steinford died prematurely.
Tina Steinford is the daughter of Paul Steinford and was very upset at his untimely passing. Ms. Steinford has no medical or nursing training. Upon his death she deduced that the defendants having prescribed Risperdal must have been wrong because of a black box on it warning not to use it on elderly patients. Mr. Steinford was 84 years old at the time it was used on him and at that time demonstrated good recall of the events of his life. Ms. Steinford saw no reason to use Risperdal on her father. Based upon her uninformed suspicion that something was wrong, she sent notices in 2005 to various defendants that she intended to sue them. However, Ms. Steinford was unable to secure a lawyer to represent her and more importantly, was unable to secure a doctor to review the records because she could not afford the fee. (See Part 5 of 8.)

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

The Complaint Properly Explains the Basis for Tolling (Due to Delayed Discovery) and Should be Allowed to Proceed.

The delayed discovery rule allows a plaintiff to bring a claim beyond the one year limitation period for medical malpractice if the criteria is met. The issue in this case is whether a plaintiff who does not have a reasonable basis for suing within one year and is trying diligently to determine the facts is precluded from suing later when the facts are discovered within the outer three year limit. The case law says that the plaintiffs can proceed.

A plaintiff must bring a claim within the limitations period after accrual of the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc, § 312 [ Civil actions, without exception, can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this title, after the cause of action shall have accrued ]; Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 397.) In other words, statutes of limitation do not begin to run until a cause of action accrues. (Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 487;
Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 797, 806.)

The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action. The discovery rule does not encourage dilatory tactics because plaintiffs are charged with presumptive knowledge of an injury if they have "information of circumstances to put [them] on inquiry" or "if they have" the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to [their] investigation.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

The Pleadings.

The Judicial Council complaint states that Tina Steinford and the Estate of Paul Steinford complain that eleven doctors and two institutions negligently caused the death of Paul Steinford and committed elderabuse. Since the filing of the complaint Universal Hospital and Camino Towers have been dismissed from the case, along with doctors Washington, Greene, and Black.

The thrust of the negligence claim is that Mr. Steinford was negligently prescribed anti-psychotic medications without his consent.

The Plaintiffs explain why the complaint was filed July 31, 2007, more than one year following the death of Mr. Steinford on May 5, 2005. It is important for the court to appreciate that the black box warning on Risperidone (Risperdal) refers to the dangers of strokes in elderly people. Mr. Steinford did not die from a stroke. So it is evident that Ms. Steinford was guessing and grasping at straws until she found present counsel and a qualified phsician to review the records and advance the theories announced.

The Legal Argument.

a. A Demurrer Examines the Pleading to Determine Its Legal Sufficiency.

On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, the standard of review is well settled. We give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.)

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.

OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER

The plaintiffs oppose the demurrer brought by defendant doctors White, Black, Greene, Brown, Smith, and James, because the plaintiffs have set out a reason why the statute of limitations was extended beyond one year and for the time it took to file the action and that the elements of a claim for elder abuse are stated. Moreover, if the court finds any deficiencies with the complaint, the plaintiffs seek leave to amend consistent with the statements made about their claims.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Overview of the Case.

This case is about the poisoning of Paul Steinford by means of multiple psycho tropic drugs that should never have been used but certainly should have been stopped when the symptoms started that lead to his death. Many of those symptoms are disclosed by the drug companies as side effects of the psycho tropic drugs. All of the treating doctors should have known that the drugs had those known side effects that included symptoms that Mr. Steinford exhibited to them including difficulty swallowing and toxicity. Dr. Washington arrived on April 26, 2005, just before Mr. Steinford's untimely death, and removed him from the psycho tropic drugs, regrettably too late to reverse the effects of those drugs and save his life.

Dr. Washington is dismissed from this lawsuit and deeply thanked for his correct actions obviously reflecting knowledge and caring. We apologize for including him. The fact of his removing Mr. Steinford from the harmful drugs was just discovered. All doctors arriving on or after April 26, 2005 have been dismissed.

For more information you are welcome to contact Sacramento personal injury lawyer, Moseley Collins.